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Authentic ecumenism is a gift at the service of  truth.1
Introduction
A recent article by Professor John V. Fesko 
of  Westminster Theological Seminary in Pro Rege 
(September 2011) answers the question regarding 
the relevance of  J. Gresham Machen (1881-1937), 
particularly his response to theological liberalism 
and its antithesis to the Gospel of  Christ. Catholic 
Christians will find much to agree with in this article 
about Machen, especially Fesko’s exhortation to 
stand with Machen against theological liberalism: 
“Machen’s stand against liberalism must be our 
stand against the same, and we must fight the battle 
with the same weapons: the Word of  God and the 
gospel of  Jesus Christ.”2 Can I get a witness? I, for 
one, say Amen! 
Significantly, although Professor Fesko does 
not mention this fact, Machen aligns himself  with 
Roman Catholics, finding common ground with 
them, in his stand against liberalism. Machen, 
entangled in a controversy with the Protestant 
liberal thought of  the Presbyterianism of  his 
day, observed, in what is rightly regarded to be a 
classic of  American evangelical thought, namely, 
Christianity and Liberalism (1923), that a wide “gulf ” 
existed between evangelical Protestantism and 
Roman Catholic thought. “But,” he quickly adds, 
“profound as it is, it seems almost trifling compared 
to the abyss which stands between us and the 
ministers of  our own [Presbyterian] tradition.” He 
continues, “How great is the common heritage 
which unites the Roman Catholic Church, with its 
maintenance of  the authority of  Holy Scripture 
and with its acceptance of  the great early creeds, 
to devout Protestants today!”3 There is no false 
irenicism in Machen’s statement, but only a mere 
acknowledgment of  the common heritage of  faith 
between evangelical Protestants and Catholics 
regarding biblical authority and the Christological 
and Trinitarian dogmas of  the early church, 
particularly the early ecumenical councils of  Nicea, 
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Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon. 
Among Reformed Protestants, Machen was 
not alone in theologically aligning himself  with 
Roman Catholics against liberalism and secularism. 
Dordt College, an institution of  higher education 
that stands in the Reformed tradition, especially the 
Dutch neo-Calvinism of  Abraham Kuyper (1837-
1920), will appreciate that Kuyper himself  wrote 
in his famous 1898 Princeton Stone Lectures, 
Lectures on Calvinism, about his ecumenical alliance 
with Catholics. Here, too, there is no false irenicism 
on Kuyper’s part. He just gives a very articulate 
statement, not only of  the common heritage of  
faith shared by Reformed Christians with the 
tradition of  Catholic Christianity but also of  the 
common spiritual enemy of  both. Kuyper wrote,
   Now, in this conflict [with theological liberal-
ism and secularism] Rome is not an antagonist, but 
stands on our side, inasmuch as she also recogniz-
es and maintains the Trinity, the Deity of  Christ, 
the Cross as an atoning sacrifice, the Scriptures as 
the Word of  God, and the Ten Commandments as 
a divinely-imposed rule of  life. Therefore, let me 
ask if  Romish theologians take up the sword to do 
valiant and skilful battle against the same tendency 
that we ourselves mean to fight to the death, is 
it not the part of  wisdom to accept the valuable 
help of  their elucidation?. . . I for my part am not 
ashamed to confess that on many points my views 
have been clarified through my study of  the Rom-
ish theologians.4
Perhaps Professor Fesko would acknowledge 
the “ecumenical hospitality” shown by Machen and 
Kuyper, even while he warns his fellow evangelical 
and Reformed Protestants in our times about the 
“alarming trend . . . growing within the broader 
church, even within the walls of  evangelicalism,” 
namely, the claim that the controversy between 
Reformation and Rome is over.5 This is not the 
place to give a Roman Catholic assessment of  the 
state of  the question regarding this controversy.6 
Fesko’s own summary judgment on this issue is 
that, if  anything, the “gulf ” between Rome and, in 
particular, evangelical and Reformed Protestants, 
has widened since the first half  of  the twentieth-
century.7 
Yes, he acknowledges change within the 
Catholic Church with Vatican II, “but it is not a 
change for the better.” In particular, “the official 
teaching of  the Roman Catholic Church has 
become worse than anything that the Council of  
Trent ever said on salvation and the doctrine of  
justification.” Rome endorses not only the teaching 
of  Trent but also “the doctrine of  the ‘anonymous 
Christian’.” In its theology of  religions, Fesko adds 
that Vatican II promotes “salvation by good works,” 
and, in particular, Rome has now turned from 
semi-Pelagianism to an unmitigated Pelagianism: 
“Rome once had semi-Pelagius upon its throne, 
but he has now abdicated his place of  honor to his 
father, Pelagius.”8 Furthermore, according to Fesko, 
Vatican II’s theology of  religions claims that there 
is no difference between the God of  the Bible and 
the God of  Islam. Fesko claims to derive all this—
the idea of  anonymous Christians, Pelagianism, and 
the relation between the God of  Islam and of  the 
Bible—from Vatican II’s Lumen Gentium (hereafter 
LG), the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, 
in particular paragraph 16.9 Since this paragraph, 
which I have broken up into 16a, 16b and 16c, is 
central to Professor Fesko’s charges against the 
Catholic Church, quoting it in full is necessary in 
order to give an assessment of  his charges.10 
In light of  St. Paul’s statement that God our 
Savior desires all men to be saved and to come 
to the knowledge of  the truth (1 Tim 2:1-4), LG 
16a deals with the closeness of  those who do 
not belong to the Church but who are in varying 
degrees related to her, as is Judaism, in terms of  the 
salvation-historical continuity between Judaism and 
Christianity, “their common spiritual patrimony,”11as 
the Council put it, or Islam’s monotheistic faith and 
the theology of  creation it entails, and so forth; 16b 
addresses the question regarding the conditions on 
how salvation might be possible for those who have 
not heard the Gospel, the unevangelized, through 
no fault of  their own; and 16c addresses the matter 
of  why “very often” those conditions are not met:  
[a] Those who have not yet received the Gospel 
are related in various ways to the people of  
God. There is, first, that people to which the 
covenants and promises were made, and from 
which Christ was born according to the flesh 
(cf. Rom 9:4-5): in view of  the divine choice, 
they are a people most dear for the sake of  
the fathers, for the gifts of  God are without 
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repentance (cf. Rom 11:29-36). But the plan of  
salvation also includes those who acknowledge 
the Creator. In the first place amongst whom 
are the Moslems: these profess to hold the faith 
of  Abraham, and together with us they adore 
the one, merciful God, mankind’s judge on the 
last day. Nor is God remote from those who 
in shadows and images seek the unknown God, 
since He gives to all men life and breath and 
all things (cf. Acts 17:25-28), and as Savior wills 
that all men be saved (cf. 1 Tim 2:4). 
[b]  Those who, through no fault of  their own, do 
not know the Gospel of  Christ or His Church, 
but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere 
heart, and moved by grace, try in their actions to 
do His will as they know it through the dictates 
of  their conscience—those too may achieve 
eternal salvation. Nor shall Divine Providence 
deny the assistance necessary for salvation to 
those who, without any fault of  theirs, have not 
yet arrived at an explicit knowledge of  God, 
and who, not without His grace, strive to live 
a good life. Whatever good or truth is found 
amongst them is considered by the Church to 
be a preparation for the Gospel and given by 
Him who enlightens all men so that they may 
finally have life. 
[c]  But very often [at saepius] men, deceived by the 
Evil One, have become vain in their reasonings, 
have exchanged the truth of  God for a lie and 
served the world rather than the Creator. Or 
else, living and dying in this world without God, 
they are exposed to ultimate despair. Wherefore 
to promote the glory of  God and procure the 
salvation of  all of  these, and mindful of  the 
command of  the Lord, “Preach the Gospel 
to every creature” (Mark 16:16), the Church 
fosters the missions with care and attention.12 
I intend this article to be a response to Professor 
Fesko’s interpretation of  LG 16. It purports to be 
an exercise in authentic ecumenism at the service 
of  the truth, as the epigraph to this article puts 
it. I will direct myself  only to his charges against 
Vatican II by rebutting them and offering an 
alternative interpretation of  LG 16.13 My argument 
proceeds in three, relatively brief  movements. First, 
I distinguish three Reformed attitudes toward 
Roman Catholicism and ask where Fesko might 
be among those distinctions. Next, guided by the 
1985 Extraordinary Synod of  the Catholic Church 
on the question of  the reception of  Vatican II 
twenty years after the close of  the Council, I set 
forth some hermeneutical principles regarding the 
interpretation of  the Council’s documents. My 
third section rebuts Fesko’s charges that Vatican II 
“promotes” (his word) the doctrine of  anonymous 
Christians, adopts a full-blown Pelagianism, and 
that its theology of  religions entails that the God of  
Islam and of  the Bible is one and wholly the same. 
Reformed Attitudes toward Roman 
Catholicism
One of  the necessary conditions for the practice 
of  authentic ecumenism, according to Vatican II’s 
Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio, is to 
make “every effort to eliminate words, judgments, 
and actions which do not respond to the condition 
of  separated brethren with truth and fairness and 
so make mutual relations between them more 
difficult.”14 This is a mutually reciprocal condition 
holding for all Christians engaged in ecumenical, 
inter-confessional dialogue. In order to put this 
condition into practice, John Paul II explains, “It is 
necessary to pass from antagonism and conflict to 
a situation where each party recognizes the other as 
a partner. When undertaking dialogue, each side must 
presuppose in the other a desire for reconciliation, for unity 
in truth.”15 In recognizing the other as a partner in 
ecumenical conversation, each must, at the very 
minimum, recognize the other as a fellow believer 
Significantly, although 
Professor Fesko does not 
mention this fact, Machen 
aligns himself with Roman 
Catholics, finding common 
ground with them, in his 
stand against liberalism.
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in Christ, desiring reconciliation in the truth. 
Those in the Reformed tradition who have 
undertaken inter-confessional dialogue under that 
condition have engaged (1) “in a fresh constructive 
and critical evaluation both of  the contemporary 
teaching and practice of  the Roman Catholic 
Church and of  the classical controverted issues.” 
But there are others in that tradition who do 
not recognize Catholics as ecumenical partners, 
brethren in Christ, because they either (2) “remain 
to be convinced that the modern developments of  
the Roman Catholic Church have really addressed 
the issues of  the Reformation,” or (3) “they 
have been largely untouched by the ecumenical 
exchanges of  recent times and have therefore not 
been challenged or encouraged to reconsider their 
traditional stance.”16 Where does Fesko belong in 
this scheme of  things?
Missing from Professor Fesko’s brief  remarks 
on Vatican II is the “ecumenical hospitality” 
exhibited by Machen and Kuyper. What we find on 
his part is an exclusively antithetical attitude toward 
Roman Catholicism. He seems, for either the 
second or third reason above, not to have passed 
from antagonism and conflict to “a desire for 
reconciliation, for unity in truth.” Why is this so? 
Briefly, I suggest that an answer can be found 
in the statement of  resolutions drawn up by 
Michael Horton, Fesko’s colleague at Westminster 
Theological Seminary, in response to the 1994 
ecumenical alliance of  Evangelicals and Catholics 
Together, which affirms the substance of  historic 
Christian orthodoxy as expressed in the Ecumenical 
Creeds of  Nicaea and Chalcedon. In the fourth 
resolution we find the statement that “the creedal 
consensus that binds orthodox Evangelicals and 
Roman Catholics together warrants the making 
of  common cause on moral and cultural issues in 
society” but not “cooperation among Christians as 
common ecclesial action in fulfilling a common 
ecclesial mission.” 17 Referring to Evangelicals and 
Catholics Together, Horton denies that this alliance 
expresses a common ecclesial action, fulfilling a 
common ecclesial mission among brothers and 
sisters in Christ; Horton’s denial, and that of  the 
other signatories to this statement of  resolutions, 
can only mean that Evangelicals and Roman 
Catholics are not in fellowship with each other, even 
imperfectly by the grace of  Christ and through 
the power of  the Spirit. This statement does not 
mean to deny that individual Catholics may be real 
Christians, but it does mean that they cannot be real 
Christians if  the theological explanation they give 
for their doctrinal assertions regarding salvation, 
the atonement, sacramental theology, divine elec-
tion, and the like derive from the ecclesiastical 
Magisterium of  the Catholic Church. In other 
words, they can’t be real Christians for Catholic 
reasons. They can only be real Christians if  their 
explanations express the Evangelical theological 
tradition:      
We affirm that individual Roman Catholics who 
for whatever reason do not self-consciously assent 
to the precise definitions of  the Roman Catholic 
Magisterium regarding justification, the sole me-
diation of  Christ, the relation between faith and 
the sacraments, the divine monergism of  the new 
birth, and similar matters of  evangelical convic-
tion, but who think and speak evangelically about 
these things, are indeed our brothers and sisters in 
Christ, despite Rome’s official position. We per-
ceive that the Roman Catholic Church contains 
many such believers. We deny, however, that in 
its present confession it is an acceptable Christian 
communion, let alone being the mother of  all the 
faithful to whom every believer needs to be re-
lated.18
Professor Fesko is not one of  the signers of  
this statement of  resolutions, but it is important 
to know whether he agrees with its reasoning. If  
he does, how then can Catholics and Protestants 
like Fesko have ecumenical dialogue with the aim 
of  unity in truth? His answer to this question will 
depend on whether he is, in the words of  Reinhart 
Hütter, an “essential Protestant” or an “accidental 
Protestant.”19 “Essential Protestantism requires 
for its identity Catholicism as the ‘other’.” Hütter 
elaborates:
Much of  essential Protestantism assumes that at 
the time of  the Reformation the true Gospel—
lost or at least significantly distorted shortly af-
ter the apostle Paul—was rediscovered and the 
Church in the true sense reconstituted. Virtually 
everything in-between, the few exceptions only af-
firming the rule, pertains to the aberration of  Ro-
man Catholicism. Essential Protestantism, there-
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fore, in a large measure needs Roman Catholicism 
and especially the papacy to know itself, to have a 
hold of  its identity as Protestantism.20
In contrast to essential Protestantism, there is 
accidential Protestantism. This sort of  Protestantism 
“sees itself  as the result of  a particular, specific 
protestation”; in short, it “has seen itself  to a 
large degree as a reform movement in the Church 
catholic.”21 “For accidental Protestants, there tends 
to be one fundamental difference—and it can be 
the Petrine office itself—that prevents them from 
being Catholic. This difference cannot be just any 
but must be one without which the truth of  the 
Gospel is decisively distorted or even abandoned. 
Being Protestant in this vein amounts to an 
emergency position necessary for the sake of  the 
Gospel’s truth and the Church’s faithfulness; in 
short, accidental Protestantism does not understand 
itself  as ecclesial normalcy.”22 Now, essential 
Protestants are not only anti-papist but also anti-
Catholic. An anti-Catholic is someone who not 
merely rejects the Catholic Church as a true visible 
expression of  Christ’s body, as an acceptable 
Christian communion—as Resolution 6 does 
above—and as the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic 
Church, but also denies that Roman Catholics are 
fellow believers by virtue of  sharing a love of  Jesus 
Christ, accepting him as Lord and Savior, affirming 
the faith of  the early ecumenical creeds, and sharing 
a familial bond in baptism and God’s Word. I want 
to put the following question to Fesko: What will it 
take for Fesko to recognize Catholics as ecumenical 
partners and to regard himself  as being engaged 
“in a fresh constructive and critical evaluation both 
of  the contemporary teaching and practice of  
the Roman Catholic Church and of  the classical 
controverted issues”?
Hermeneutical Rules for Interpreting Council 
Documents
In 1985, on the twentieth anniversary of  the 
close of  the Second Vatican Council, John Paul II 
convened an extraordinary assembly of  the Synod 
of  Bishops. With the aim in mind of  encouraging 
a deeper reception and implementation of  the 
Council’s documents, the Synod set forth in the 
Final Report a proper hermeneutic of  the Council, 
namely, a framework for properly interpreting 
them, in particular, six hermeneutical principles for 
sound interpretation.23 These principles should be 
adhered to by all would-be interpreters of  Vatican 
II, not only Catholics, then, but also Evangelical 
commentators of  the Council, such as Fesko, 
William Lane Craig, Clark Pinnock, Ronald Nash, 
and Harold A. Netland, among others, who purport 
to make claims about what the Council teaches.24 
Pared down for my purpose here, these principles 
are as follows:
1. The theological interpretation of  the conciliar 
doctrine must show attention to all the docu-
ments, in themselves and in their close inter-re-
lationship, in such a way that the integral mean-
ing of  the Council’s affirmations—often very 
complex—might be understood and expressed.
2. The four constitutions of  the council (those on 
liturgy, Church, revelation, and the Church in 
the modern world) are the hermeneutical key 
to the other documents—namely, the council’s 
nine decrees and three declarations.
3. The pastoral import of  the documents ought 
not to be separated from, or set in opposition 
to, their doctrinal content.
4. No opposition may be made between the spirit 
and the letter of  Vatican II.
5. The council must be interpreted in continuity 
with the great tradition of  the church, includ-
ing earlier councils. The Church is one and the 
same throughout all the councils.
6. Vatican II should be accepted as illuminating 
the problems of  our own day.25
In the next section, I will illustrate the particular 
importance of  the first and fifth principles in my 
rebuttal of  Professor Fesko’s interpretation of  
Missing from Professor 
Fesko’s brief remarks 
on Vatican II is the 
“ecumenical hospitality” 
exhibited by Machen and 
Kuyper.
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Lumen Gentium 16
Anonymous Christians
Professor Fesko claims not merely that the idea of  
the “anonymous Christian,” the theologoumenon,31 
as I shall call it, developed by Karl Rahner (1904-
1984),32 is compatible with some part of  LG 16 
but that the Vatican Council promotes this idea.33 I 
now propose to show not only that the Council 
does not promote this theologoumenon but also 
that the central claims, if  not all the assumptions 
of  this theologoumenon, are incompatible with 
the teachings of  LG and other Council documents. 
Since Fesko never actually says what the idea of  
the “anonymous Christian” is, I’ll begin by stating 
precisely and specifically what it means.
Despite the limitations of  the typology of  
exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, I will use 
it to state the Rahnerian idea of  “anonymous 
Christians.” Regarding exclusivism, we must 
distinguish between ontological and epistemological 
exclusivism. Rahner is an ontological exclusivist 
because he holds not only that “God desires the 
salvation of  everyone,” but also that “this salvation 
willed by God is the salvation won by Christ.”34 In 
short, in reply to the question of  whether a man can 
be saved apart from the finished works of  Christ, 
Rahner’s answer is a definitive “no.” Thus, Rahner is 
not a religious pluralist because he holds that not all 
religions are equally vehicles of  salvation.35 But he 
is also not an epistemological exclusivist because he 
holds that a man might be saved apart from explicitly 
acknowledging and responding to Christ and his 
saving works. Now, the inclusivist is an ontological 
exclusivist but an epistemological inclusivist; he 
holds that there is no salvation apart from Christ 
but not necessarily through explicit faith in him. 
How might a man come to saving faith apart from 
explicitly acknowledging Christ? In particular, 
Rahner has in mind the question regarding the 
fate of  the unevangelized; namely, what is the fate 
of  those who through no fault of  their own have 
never heard the Gospel of  Jesus Christ? The idea 
of  “anonymous Christians” purports to answer 
that question.
Pared down for my purpose here, this complex 
idea has the following elements:
1. (a) There is no salvation apart from Christ; (b) 
God desires the salvation of  all men; and (c) 
LG 16. For now, it is important to understand 
that the first principle’s hermeneutical norm is 
twofold:26 one, in its intratextuality, meaning thereby 
interpreting the meaning of  a conciliar text within 
the context of  the whole document; and two, in 
its intertextuality, meaning thereby interpreting any 
specific document in the context of  the whole 
body of  documents of  Vatican II. Furthermore, 
as the fifth principle states, intertextuality involves 
attending to the living tradition of  the Church, 
including earlier councils, in the interpretation of  
the Council’s documents, an approach that Benedict 
XVI has called “the hermeneutics of  continuity and 
renewal.”27
There is another fundamental hermeneutical 
rule to consider in the interpretation of  conciliar 
documents. What is, then, this hermeneutical 
principle? Essentially it posits that we should not 
make judgments about, say, the Councils of  Trent 
and Vatican I without understanding the integral 
totality of  Catholicism because the statements of  
these councils were polemical and antithetical. In 
other words, all truth formulated for polemical 
reasons is partial—albeit true. Consider Hans Urs 
von Balthasar’s explication of  this methodological 
principle: “Even though, of  course, the truth of  
the Councils of  Trent and Vatican I will never be 
overtaken or even relativized, nonetheless there 
are still other views and aspects of  revelation than 
those expressed there. This has always happened 
throughout church history, when new statements are 
brought forth to complete earlier insights in order 
to do justice to the inexhaustible riches of  divine 
revelation even in the earthen vessel of  human 
language.”28 In other words, the truth of  these 
doctrinal statements needs to be supplemented in 
order to present a more balanced or comprehensive 
view.29 Furthermore, Aidan Nichols has rightly 
noted that “We must not ask for perfection from 
Councils, even in their doctrinal aspect. It is enough 
to know that, read according to a hermeneutic of  
continuity, they will not lead us astray. An Ecumenical 
Council will never formally commit the Church to 
doctrinal error. It is, moreover, unfair to ask of  
Councils what they have not claimed to provide.”30 
Against this background, I turn now to illustrate the 
bearing of  these hermeneutical principles on the 
interpretation of  LG 16.
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therefore—given (b), God’s universal salvific 
will—“every human being is really and truly ex-
posed to the influence of  divine, supernatural 
grace which offers an interior union with God 
and by means of  which God communicates 
himself  whether the individual takes up an at-
titude of  acceptance or of  refusal towards this 
grace.”36 This supernatural grace has its source 
in the saving work of  Christ.37
2. This divine grace, which Rahner calls a “super-
natural existential,”38 is neither the common 
grace of  creation nor some receptive capacity, a 
so-called potentia oboedientialis, for the supernatural, 
but is best thought of  as a form of  general pre-
venient grace: God’s free, unmerited, and forgiv-
ing self-communication “on the basis of  God’s 
saving action in Christ,”39 since this “supernatural 
existential” does not itself  bring about salvation 
because every individual has the possibility of  ac-
cepting or rejecting this grace. As Ralph Martin 
rightly notes, “The individual’s response to this 
supernatural existential is critical.”40
3. The conditions under which the salvation of  
non-Christians—those especially who through 
no fault of  their own have never heard the Gos-
pel—may be possible, whether they know it or 
not, because (a) he “does not in any absolute or 
ultimate sense act against his own conscience,”41 
(b) he “makes a moral decision in his life . . . 
[that] can also be thought to measure up to the 
character of  a supernaturally elevated, believing 
and thus saving act, and hence to be more in 
actual fact than merely ‘natural morality’,”42 and 
(c) “he really accepts himself  completely.”43 Briefly, 
by complete self-acceptance, Rahner means ac-
cepting that I am always already transcending 
myself  and the finite world towards the infinite 
and absolute horizon that opens me to truth, 
goodness, and being. Rahner identifies this ho-
rizon with God. He claims that, in light of  the 
Christian revelation, we may say that this open-
ness, which everyone now lives within, whether 
he knows it or not, when informed by the gift 
of  supernatural grace, directs the individual to-
wards the absolute self-revelation of  God in 
Christ.44 In this light, we can understand why 
Rahner says, “He who . . . accepts his existence 
. . . says . . . Yes to Christ even if  he does not 
know it”45 (a) and (b) includes selfless acts of  
love, epistemic judgments of  truth, and moral 
acts of  goodness, the latter being acts of  “daily 
fidelity, responsibility, virtue and loving ser-
vice.”46 Implicit acts of  (c) self-acceptance in-
volve simply just being human—“whereby a 
person undertakes and lives the duty of  each day 
in the quiet sincerity of  patience, in devotion to 
his material duties and the demands made upon 
him by the persons under his care.”47 Rahner 
regards all these as implicit acts of  faith, that 
is, implicit acts of  acceptance of  God’s super-
natural existential grace, and hence those who 
make such acts not only accept themselves but 
also accept God’s self-communication in grace, 
whether they know it or not, and he refers to 
them as “anonymous Christians.”
4. Rahner assumes a virtually unlimited optimism 
regarding the probable (not just possible!) sal-
vation of  most non-Christians, yes, not apart 
from Christ and the offer of  supernatural grace, 
but apart from explicit knowledge of  Christ: 
“It is . . . impossible to think that this offer of  
supernatural, divinizing grace made to all men 
on account of  the universal salvific purpose of  
God, should in general (prescinding from the 
relatively few exceptions) remain ineffective in 
most cases on account of  the personal guilt of  
men.” Regarding, then, the response-rate to 
that offer, Rahner states that “we have no really 
conclusive reason for thinking pessimistically of  
men” and “every reason for thinking optimisti-
cally of  God and his salvific will which is more 
powerful than the extremely limited stupidity 
and evil-mindedness of  men.”48  
. . . the truth of these 
doctrinal statements 
needs to be supplemented 
in order to present 
a more balanced or 
comprehensive view.
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Pared down for my purpose here, I now will 
state where the bishops of  Vatican II, particularly 
with reference to LG 16, come down on these four 
points. Regarding point 1, the Council agrees with 
(a) and (b), but also with (c), if  properly understood. 
To understand (c) properly, we need to read LG 16, 
first, in the context of  LG 14, which reaffirms the 
historic Catholic teaching on the threefold necessity 
of  faith, baptism, and the Church for salvation. We 
also need to read LG 16 in light of  the preceding 
paragraph, LG 15, which affirms the genuine, albeit 
imperfect, communion of  the Catholic Church 
with “separated brethren,” namely, non-Catholic 
Christians because there exist elements of  grace 
and truth outside the visible boundaries of  the 
Church.49 LG 16a follows this up with the question 
regarding not those who belong to the Church, 
either fully or imperfectly, but the profound mystery 
of  how God in Christ may deal graciously with 
those who have not heard the Gospel, especially 
those committed non-Christians.50 As Berkouwer 
rightly puts it, “the Church can see signs of  God’s 
grace and presence in this human life that is extra 
ecclesiam.”51 In particular, it is dealing with those who 
through no fault of  their own (see LG 16b above) 
have failed to respond to the Gospel, and so what it 
says does not apply generally.52 
Furthermore, the Council refuses to answer the 
question of  how the nonculpably ignorant might 
come to salvation without explicitly responding 
to Christ: “All this [(a) and (b)] holds true not 
only for Christians but also for all men of  good 
will in whose hearts grace is active invisibly. For 
since Christ died for all, and since all men are in 
fact called to one and the same destiny, which is 
divine, we must hold that the Holy Spirit offers to 
all the possibility of  being made partners, in a way 
known to God alone, in the paschal mystery.”53 Rahner 
acknowledges that “Vatican II is certainly extremely 
reserved,” and I would add agnostic, with regard 
to the answer to this question, but that boundary 
does not stop him from developing the idea of  
“anonymous Christians.”54 What LG 16b does say 
is that “whatever goodness or truth” is found in 
these non-Christian religions “is looked upon by the 
Church as a preparation for the gospel [praeparatio 
evangelica].”55 The Council adds, “She regards such 
qualities as given by him who enlightens all men so 
that they may finally [tandem] have life.” The Church, 
then, looks upon whatever truth and goodness is 
found as a preparation for the gospel, meaning 
thereby that it prepares men to receive the Gospel 
of  Jesus Christ, in whom completion is found: “She 
proclaims and is in duty bound to proclaim without 
fail, Christ who is the way, the truth, and the life 
(John 14:6). In him, in whom God reconciled 
all things to himself  (2 Cor 5:18-19), men find 
the fullness of  their religious life [plenitudo vitae 
religiosae].” 56 It is clear from these statements that 
the Church does not assert that a man finds life in 
these religions; life is to be found solely in Christ 
and his Church. In other words, Vatican II does not 
recognize non-Christian religions to be means of  
God’s saving grace in Christ. Again to quote from 
LG, but this time from paragraph 17, 
The Church is driven by the Holy Spirit to do her 
part for the full realization of  the plan of  God, 
who has constituted Christ as the source of  sal-
vation for the whole world. By her proclamation 
of  the Gospel, she draws her hearers to perceive 
and profess the faith, she prepares them for bap-
tism, snatches them from the slavery of  error, and 
she incorporates them into Christ so that in love 
for him they grow to full maturity. The effect of  
her work is that whatever good is found sown in 
the minds and hearts of  men or in the rites and 
customs of  peoples, these not only are preserved 
from destruction, but are purified, raised up, and 
perfected for the glory of  God, the confusion of  
the devil, and the happiness of  man.
Which elements of  truths and goodness, 
how many, distinguishing them from error, both 
metaphysical and moral, and how the former are 
precisely used by the prevenient grace of  God 
preparing men to respond to the gospel is an open 
question, an a posteriori question, depending on the 
religion in question. 
Regarding point 2, Ralph Martin correctly 
expresses the biblical teaching that “God offers 
sufficient grace for salvation to every human being, 
and that where sin abounds, grace abounds even 
more [Rom 5:20].”57 So, even though LG does not 
use the terms “supernatural existential,” it does 
refer to the reality signified by those terms, namely, 
the prevenient grace of  God’s universal salvific will. 
The major points of  divergence between LG 16 
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and Rahner’s idea of  the “anonymous Christian” are 
found in points 3 and 4. Let me first deal with point 
4 before point 3. Point 4 concerns the optimism 
of  salvation supported by Rahner regarding those 
who have not heard the Gospel. I think we can 
definitively say that the only way that we can infer 
such optimism from LG 16 is if  we fail to read 
16a and 16b in the context of  16c, excluding from 
consideration as well “its foundational references 
to the scriptural and doctrinal foundations of  its 
teachings.”58 Let me briefly explain. 
I distinguished above between epistemological 
exclusivism and inclusivism. Many interpreters of  
Vatican II simply assume that the Council adopts 
a broad epistemological inclusivism, drawing the 
automatic conclusion from this, given its alleged 
optimism, that more people are actually saved 
without hearing the Gospel than lost because most 
people actually respond to the prevenient grace of  
God’s universal salvific will. Karl Rahner is chief  
among those interpreters.59 But this optimistic 
reading of  LG 16 is unsustainable when we consider 
that 16c states, in light of  scriptural testimony, that 
the “response rate” of  the unevangelized is such 
that “very often” [at saepius] they are deceived by 
the Evil One, becoming, then, “futile in their 
thinking, their foolish hearts being darkened, 
because they exchanged the truth about God for a 
lie and worshipped and served the creature rather 
than the Creator” (Rom 1:21, 25). Considered in 
this light, the optimistic reading is stopped dead in 
its track: LG 16 does not imply, let alone promote, 
the idea that more people are actually saved without 
hearing the Gospel than lost. Consequently, at best 
we can say that LG 16 is compatible with a narrow 
epistemological inclusivism, supporting some form 
of  accessibilism,60 that is, the possibility of  people 
being saved under very specific conditions, such 
as, being nonculpable for their ignorance of  the 
Gospel.61 Better yet, I would prefer to say that LG 16 
best fits an opaque exclusivism because the realization 
of  the possibility of  salvation for the nonculpably 
ignorant is left to God. That is where the matter is 
left:  “For since Christ died for all, and since all men 
are in fact called to one and the same destiny, which 
is divine, we must hold that the Holy Spirit offers 
to all the possibility of  being made partners, in a way 
known to God alone, in the paschal mystery.”62 This 
calling is about the offer of  grace, not its efficacy 
and finality. Thus, “God calls men to be participants 
in his grace; by what means and with what effect is 
not here stated.”63 
Finally, as far as the idea of  the “anonymous 
Christian” is concerned, there remains to say 
something briefly about point 3 above, namely, 
about implicit and explicit Christianity. Suppose 
salvation, by God’s grace, is possible for the 
individual that is extra ecclesiam and who, without 
explicitly responding to the Gospel, is nonculpable 
for his ignorance of  it. Does LG 16 teach that, say, 
his living in conformity with what he knows of  
God’s will, of  following the light of  his conscience, 
and of  completely accepting his humanity in the 
fundamental act of  self-transcendence implies that 
as such he is making implicit acts of  faith in Christ 
in ignorance, implicitly accepting God’s redeeming 
grace and, therefore, is saved? I see no evidence to 
support the claim that in LG 16, or elsewhere in the 
Council’s documents, a good Buddhist or Hindu or 
Moslem or even, for that matter, a good Jew is an 
implicit Christian. If  the possibility of  salvation is 
realized for the nonculpably unevangelized, they 
are saved objectively on the basis of  Christ’s atoning 
work, but they are saved subjectively because God’s 
prevenient grace elicits a faith response to the light 
and understanding they do have of  God’s general 
revelation in nature and conscience.
Furthermore, given Rahner’s and others’ 
optimism of  salvation, “If  people can be saved 
without hearing the Gospel, and if  except for a few, 
rare exceptions [as Rahner alleges] we can presume 
that almost everybody is saved, why bother to 
I see no evidence to 
support the claim that 
in LG 16 . . . a good 
Buddhist or Hindu or 
Moslem or even . . . a 
good Jew is an implicit 
Christian.
10     Pro Rege—March 2012
preach it?”64 In contrast to this reductio ad absurdum, 
which implies that making a concrete confession 
and explicit witness of  Christian faith (see Rom 10: 
9-10, 14-15) is not necessary for being saved, LG 
16c urges the Church to not only heed the “Lord’s 
command, ‘preach the Gospel to every creature’ 
(Mk 16:16),” but also to make “the words of  the 
apostle [Paul] her own, ‘Woe to me if  I do not 
preach the Gospel’ (1 Cor 9:16).”  Hence, we see 
the import of  these words in Vatican II’s Decree on 
the Church’s Missionary Activity, Ad Gentes:
Christ is the Truth and the Way which the preach-
ing of  the Gospel lays open to all men when it 
speaks those words of  Christ in their ear: “Repent, 
and believe the Gospel” (Mark 1:13). Since he who 
does not believe is already judged (cf. John 3:18), 
the words of  Christ are at once words of  judg-
ment and grace, of  life and death. For it is only 
by putting to death that which is old that we can 
come to newness of  life.65       
Pelagianism
I now need to make a few comments regarding 
Professor Fesko’s charge that LG 16 espouses 
salvation by good works and hence Pelagianism. 
This charge arises from several references in the 
Council documents to the concrete deeds of  
“men of  good will,” those striving to live a “good 
life” (GS 22) and “trying in their actions to do his 
will as they know it through the dictates of  their 
conscience” (LG 16b). Rahner correctly remarks 
that LG 16 “is in no way implying that here in these 
cases salvation is achieved as it were in a substitute 
fashion by means of  a purely natural morality. This 
would indeed contradict Scripture and magisterium. 
It is also excluded by the words of  the Constitution 
[LG] itself: salvation is reached ‘non sine divina gratia’, 
‘sub influxu gratiae’.”66 Still, since there is a connection 
here between morality and salvation, it is important 
to ask what conception of  grace is involved here 
since Fesko’s charge completely overlooks that, as 
Berkouwer also rightly notes, “morality is spoken 
of  as under the influence of  grace.”67 
Professor Fesko’s charge misses, then, that 
in those references to morality we find phrases 
such as “in whose hearts grace is active invisibly” 
and “moved by grace” as well as “not without 
grace.” The reality of  grace to which these phrases 
refer is connected to the saving work of  Christ. 
Furthermore, charges like Fesko’s also overlook, 
as Gilbert Meilaender rightly notes, “that, however 
it may be that the Spirit of  Christ manages to 
accomplish this in some ‘men of  good will,’ what 
the Spirit does is bring them into communion 
with Jesus.”68 One final thing that Professor Fesko 
also misses, but which is present explicitly in LG 
15 (note: the need to read contextually!), is that, as 
Meilaender puts it, “Christians themselves should 
know that (in St. Paul’s words) they have nothing 
to boast of  before God. They have no claim on 
God and no ability of  their own to please him.”69 
Indeed, in the words of  the bishops of  the Council, 
“All the children of  the Church should nevertheless 
remember that their exalted condition results, not 
from their own merits, but from the grace of  Christ. 
If  they fail to respond in thought, word, and deed 
to that grace, not only shall they not be saved, but 
they shall be the more severely judged.”
Perhaps the phrases “good will” and “good 
life” as well as the reference to acts of  conscience 
distracted Fesko into thinking that they lay the 
foundation for saving faith in good works. Still, 
there is no justifiable reason to draw his conclusion 
that the Church affirms Pelagianism, given the 
undeniable fact that the reality of  grace to which 
these phrases refer is inherently connected to the 
saving work of  Christ. Further, although LG 16 is 
quite adequately non-Pelagian in the language it uses, 
my point is reinforced when one takes into account 
Gaudium et Spes 22. In this latter passage, not only is 
grace invisibly at work in the hearts of  men, but also 
salvation, rather than being a matter of  good will, 
is decisively a work of  the “Holy Spirit,” which “in 
a manner known only to God offers to every man 
the possibility of  being associated with the paschal 
mystery.” In other words, whenever salvation 
does occur for the nonculpably unevangelized, it 
is determined by the redeeming grace of  Christ; 
objectively accomplished in the mystery of  his 
passion, death on the cross, and resurrection; and 
brought to bear on him by the sanctifying grace of  
the Holy Spirit. 
 
The God of Islam and of the Bible
  Do Christians and Moslems worship the same 
God? Professor Fesko lays one final charge at the 
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door of  the Catholic Church; namely, he alleges that 
LG 16a70 responds in a wholly affirmative manner 
to this question. His rejoinder to the Church is that 
faith in the God of  Islam and faith in the God of  
the Bible “hold nothing in common.”71 Now, I 
respectfully submit that Fesko’s allegation that the 
Church gives a simple “yes” to this opening question 
is false. As Timothy George wisely notes, “There 
are some questions that do not allow for a simple 
yes or no answer, and this is one of  them.”72 Briefly, 
I want to show why the answer to the question 
whether Christians and Moslems worship the same 
God is both yes and no. As Kenneth Cragg once 
clearly put the point I want to argue, and which I 
think rightly captures the position of  the bishops 
of  the Council, “The answer to the vexed question, 
‘Is the God of  Islam and the God of  the Gospel 
the same?’ can only rightly be ‘Yes! and No!’ Yes, 
as the common ground of  all we say in partial 
unison: No, insofar as our convictions diverge. It 
would be foolish to make either the convergence 
or the divergence total, to identify altogether or to 
contrast only.”73  
First, let us be clear about what Vatican II does 
not say about Islam. The bishops of  the Council do 
not affirm that special revelation is found in Islam, 
either in the Qur’ān or in Muhammad, as it is in 
Judaism and Christianity. Significantly, then, neither 
this religious text nor Muhammad as a prophet is 
recognized by the Council in LG 16a or in NA 3. We 
can easily understand why. Vatican II’s Dei Verbum, 
the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, 
teaches that special revelation is exclusive to the 
Old and New Testaments.74 Further, contrary to 
the claim of  Islam that Muhammad is Allah’s final 
Messenger, the prophet of  Islam, who allegedly 
came to complete and correct the Old and New 
Testaments, bringing the revelation of  Christ to 
fulfillment, the Catholic Church teaches that Jesus 
Christ “is himself  both the mediator and fullness 
of  Revelation.”75
Second, what, then, does Vatican II say about 
Islam as far as correspondences are concerned 
between the latter and Christianity? In answering 
this question, we need to be mindful of  the point 
that Jesuit priest and theologian Samir Khali Samir 
makes, namely, “that even behind identical or 
similar expression, there can be totally different 
meanings that are important to learn in order to 
deepen one’s knowledge of  the truth, not for any 
desire to emphasize the distinctions.”76 A more 
precise way to put the point that Fr. Samir is making 
here is to answer the question whether Muslims and 
Christians have the same God by distinguishing, 
along with Kenneth Cragg, between theological 
subject and theological predicate.77 In other words, 
do they speak of  the same theological subject when 
they predicate of  God? Yes, they do in one sense, 
since Muslims and Christians are monotheists who 
predicate of  God that he is “the one God, living and 
subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-power, the 
Creator of  heaven and earth.”78 In this sense, then, 
Christians and Muslims believe in the same God, 
the one God, of  monotheism and the theology of  
creation this entails. 
Still, they may not only differ in understanding 
what it is they predicate of  him but also diverge 
fundamentally in the predicates ascribed to him. 
For instance, both Muslims and Christians predicate 
of  God that he is one, yet they profoundly differ 
in their understanding of  that predicate.79 The 
Christian dogma of  the Trinity rejects as false the 
Unitarianism of  Islam. That dogma affirms that 
“God is one but not solitary,”80 for he himself  
exists in the communion of  “three divine persons 
eternally united in being, relationship, and love.”81 
As John Paul II rightly explains, 
We know that in the light of  the full Revelation in 
Christ, this mysterious oneness cannot be reduced 
to a numerical unity. The Christian mystery leads 
us to contemplate in God’s substantial unity the 
persons of  the Father, the Son and the Holy Spir-
it: each possesses the divine substance whole and 
indivisible, but each is distinct from the other by 
virtue of  their reciprocal relations. Their relations 
in no way compromise the oneness of  God, as the 
Still, there is no justifiable 
reason to draw his 
conclusion that the church 
affirms Pelagianism. . . .
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Fourth Lateran Council explains (1215): “Each of  
the persons is that supreme reality, viz., the divine 
substance, essence or nature. . . . It does not gen-
erate, is not begotten and does not proceed” [De 
Fide catholica, chapter 2]. The Christian doctrine on 
the Trinity, confirmed by the Councils, explicitly 
rejects any form of  “tritheism” or “polytheism.” 
In this sense, i.e., with reference to the one divine 
substance, there is significant correspondence 
between Christianity and Islam. However, this 
correspondence must not let us forget the differ-
ence between the two religions. We know that the 
unity of  God is expressed in the mystery of  the 
three divine Persons. Indeed, since he is Love (cf. 
1 Jn 4:8), God has always been a Father who gives 
his whole self  in begetting the Son, and both are 
united in a communion of  love which is the Holy 
Spirit. This distinction and compenetration [mutu-
al indwelling] (perichoresis) of  the three divine Per-
sons is not something added to their unity but is 
its most profound and characteristic expression.82
This last point regarding the truth of  the Trinity 
means that Muslims and Christians also profoundly 
differ not only in their understanding of  common 
predicates, such as the oneness of  God, but also in 
the very predicates they make of  him. Trinitarian 
dogma involves predicating some essentially and 
irreducibly true statements about God, and the 
source of  this fundamental difference concerns 
the incompatible responses given by Muslims 
and Christians to the question concerning who 
Jesus Christ really is. The answer to that question 
is inherently and necessarily tied to the central 
tenets of  the Christian faith, namely, the truths of  
the Incarnation, life, passion, death on the cross, 
resurrection, and ascension of  Jesus Christ, who is 
wholly and truly man and wholly and truly God.83 
Therefore, as Cragg rightly emphasizes, “God in 
the Qur’ān is not ‘the God and Father of  our Lord 
Jesus Christ’. That is not a predication of  Islamic 
doctrine. Carrying back that significance into the 
‘subject’, Allāh means a ‘difference’ in how God 
is understood.” 84 And the difference is such that 
although Christians and Muslims adore the one, 
true God (LG 16a, NA 3), having the same God 
as their referent, it is only those who know Jesus 
who then would also know the Father (John 14:6-
9; 1 John), and hence we cannot legitimately claim 
that the Muslim knows the God that he worships (1 
John 4:2-3; 2 John 1: 7-9). This is especially evident 
when “knowing” is understood “in its full breadth,” 
a knowing that “can rightly be called ‘communion’ 
(1 John 1:3), since it is a share in the same life (John 
14: 19f), a union perfect in the truth of  love (John 
17:26; cf. 1 John 2:3f; 3:16).”85 
Cragg’s last point brings us back to Fr. Samir’s 
thesis that even identical referents may have different 
meanings. This is in fact the case with respect to the 
reference to Abraham in LG 16a. It also brings us 
back to Professor Fesko’s charge that the Catholic 
Church holds that the faith of  Abraham is the faith 
of  Islam, and to the conclusion of  my response to 
him. 
Pace Fesko, the bishops of  the Council do not 
hold that the faith of  Abraham is the faith of  
Muslims. LG 16a states that Muslims “profess to 
hold the faith of  Abraham,” and NA 3 states that 
the “Islamic faith is pleased to associate itself ” 
with Abraham. Yes, Muslims follow the example 
of  Abraham in submitting to God, states NA 3, 
but neither the latter nor LG 16a holds that a real 
salvific relationship, let alone a covenantal one, exists 
between Muslims and Abraham, as if  Abraham is a 
common source of  faith in the history of  salvation 
between Christians and Muslims.86 By contrast, 
states NA 4, there exists a “spiritual bond linking 
the people of  the New Covenant with Abraham’s 
stock.” In other words,
The Church of  Christ acknowledges that in God’s 
plan of  salvation the beginning of  her faith and 
election is to be found in the patriarchs, Moses, 
and the prophets. She professes that all Christ’s 
faithful, who as men of  faith are sons of  Abraham 
(cf. Gal 3:7), are included in the same patriarch’s 
call and that the salvation of  the Church is mys-
tically prefigured in the exodus of  God’s chosen 
people from the land of  bondage. 87
That the bishops of  the Council did not affirm 
a spiritual patrimony common to Christians and 
Muslims is even clearer when we consider the 
first draft of  LG 16a: “The sons of  Ishmael who, 
professing Abraham as a father, also believe in 
the God of  Abraham.”88 One might have some 
grounds for Fesko’s charge on the basis of  this 
draft but not on the final version. The latter states 
only that Muslims profess “to hold the faith of  
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Abraham.” This statement does not imply that there 
exists a salvation-historical continuity or covenantal 
relation between Muslims and Abraham. Rightly so, 
since in reply to the question “Who are the sons of  
Abraham?” the answer must be (in the words of  
St. Paul) “the men of  faith” (Gal 3:7; see also, 3:9), 
namely “those who are justified by faith in Christ 
and whose life is guided by the principle of  faith.”89 
Therefore, Islam fails to pass the “Galatian test of  
what it means to be Abrahamic”:
Abraham is not . . . one source of  three faiths 
[Judaism, Christianity, and Islam]. Christ was his 
“singular issue” (Gal 3:16), Christ and only Christ. 
What counted with Abraham in God’s saving plan 
was “his faith in God” (3:5), for which he was 
blessed (3:13). In the fullness of  time that blessing 
was Christ Jesus, nothing else. Abraham in God’s 
saving plan is not a “source” of  anything else. Such 
an assertion is not “the gospel of  Christ” but “an-
other gospel” (1:6f). Making references to Abra-
ham in a religious document like the Koran and 
citing him as a example of  a prophet and believer 
in the oneness of  God is not Abrahamic therefore 
in the Christian understanding of  “Abrahamic.” 
Judaism led to Christ, therefore it was Abrahamic. 
Islam does not.90
In conclusion, in rebutting Professor Fesko’s 
charges that LG 16 affirms the theologoumenon 
of  the “anonymous Christian,” the heresy of  
Pelagianism, and that the God of  Islam and of  
Christianity is wholly identical, I trust that I have 
provided some context for further ecumenical 
conversation between us. In the words of  the 
epigraph to this article, “Authentic ecumenism is a 
gift at the service of  truth.” I hope that as fellow 
Christians we shall avail ourselves of  the Lord’s 
gift.91
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